UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE

1. Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, enacted after the effective date of the Presidential Proclamation terminating hostilities on December 31, 1946, and limiting the rent which may be charged for certain housing accommodations in "defense rental areas," is a valid exercise of the war power of Congress. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146; Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264; @ 78 U. S. 141-146.

2. The constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise, and the legislative history shows that Congress was invoking its war power to cope with a current condition of which the war was a direct and immediate cause. P. 333 U. S. 144. clubjuris

Page 333 U. S. 139

3. The Act prescribes adequate standards for the guidance of administrative action and does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. Pp. 333 U. S. 144-145.

4. By its exemption of certain classes of housing accommodations, the Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment. P. 333 U. S. 145.

5. The fact that the property regulated suffers a decrease in value is no more fatal to the exercise of the war power than it is where the police power is invoked to the same end. P. 333 U. S. 146.

74 F.Supp. 546, reversed.

The Housing Expediter sued to enjoin violations of Title II of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947. The District Court denied a permanent injunction on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional. 74 F.Supp. 546. On direct appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 333 U. S. 146.