UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE

Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) establishes a federal recording system that is designed to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed land management decisions. Section 314(b) requires that mining claims located prior to FLPMA's enactment be initially recorded with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within three years of the enactment, and § 314(a) requires that the claimant, in the year of initial recording and "prior to December 31" of every year after that, file with state officials and the BLM a notice of intention to hold a claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form. Section 314(c) provides that failure to comply with either of these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment" of the claim. Appellees, who had purchased mining claims before 1976, complied with the initial recording requirement but failed to meet on time their first annual filing requirement, not filing with the BLM until December 31. Subsequently, the BLM notified appellees that their claims had been declared abandoned and void due to their tardy filing. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, appellees filed an action in Federal District Court, alleging that § 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation and denied them due process. The District Court issued summary judgment in appellees' favor, holding that § 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that claimants who fail to make a timely filing intended to abandon their claims. Alternatively, the court held that the 1-day late filing "substantially complied" with § 314(a) and the implementing regulations.

Held:

1. Section 314(a)'s plain language -- "prior to December 31" -- read in conjunction with BLM regulations makes clear that the annual filings must be made on or before December 30. Thus, the BLM did not act ultra vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. Pp. 471 U. S. 93-96.

2. Congress intended in § 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. Pp. 471 U. S. 97-100. clubjuris

Page 471 U. S. 85

3. The annual filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late -- even by one day. Pp. 471 U. S. 100-102.

4. Section 314(c) is not unconstitutional. Pp. 471 U. S. 103-110.

(a) Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting the filing requirement, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment in § 314(c), and in applying the requirement and sanction to claims located before FLPMA was enacted. Pp. 471 U. S. 104-107.

(b) Appellees' property loss was one they could have avoided with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time, not Congress' action, that caused their property rights to be extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take" private property when an individual's reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulations. Pp. 107-108.

(c) FLPMA provides appellees with all the process that is their constitutional due. The Act's recording provisions clearly afford those within the Act's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements. As the Act constitutes purely economic regulation, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the national recording system work. Pp. 108-110.

573 F.Supp. 472, reversed and remanded.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 110. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 112. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 117. clubjuris

Page 471 U. S. 86