UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE

DOW CHEMICAL CO. V. UNITED STATES, 476 U. S. 227 (1986)

476 U. S. 227

U.S. Supreme Court

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

No. 84-1259

Argued December 10, 1985

Decided May 19, 1986

476 U.S. 227

Syllabus

Petitioner operates a 2,000-acre chemical plant consisting of numerous covered buildings, with outdoor manufacturing equipment and piping conduits located between the various buildings exposed to visual observation from the air. Petitioner maintains elaborate security around the perimeter of the complex, barring ground-level public views of the area. When petitioner denied a request by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for an on-site inspection of the plant, EPA did not seek an administrative search warrant, but instead employed a commercial aerial photographer, using a standard precision aerial mapping camera, to take photographs of the facility from various altitudes, all of which were within lawful navigable airspace. Upon becoming aware of the aerial photography, petitioner brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that EPA's action violated the Fourth Amendment and was beyond its statutory investigative authority. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that EPA's aerial observation did not exceed its investigatory authority and that the aerial photography of petitioner's plant complex without a warrant was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.

Held:

1. The fact that aerial photography by petitioner's competitors might be barred by state trade secrets law is irrelevant to the questions presented in this case. Governments do not generally seek to appropriate trade secrets of the private sector, and the right to be free of appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law. Moreover, state tort law governing unfair competition does not define the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 476 U. S. 231-233.

2. The use of aerial observation and photography is within EPA's statutory authority. When Congress invests an agency such as EPA with enforcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly every technique that may be used in the course of executing the statutory mission. Although § 114(a) of the Clean Air Act, which provides for EPA's right of entry to premises for inspection purposes, clubjuris

Page 476 U. S. 228

does not authorize aerial observation, that section appears to expand, not restrict, EPA's general investigatory powers, and there is no suggestion in the statute that the powers conferred by § 114(a) are intended to be exclusive. EPA needs no explicit statutory provision to employ methods of observation commonly available to the public at large. Pp. 476 U. S. 233-234.

3. EPA's taking, without a warrant, of aerial photographs of petitioner's plant complex from an aircraft lawfully in public navigable airspace was not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The open areas of an industrial plant complex such as petitioner's are not analogous to the "curtilage" of a dwelling, which is entitled to protection as a place where the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept. See California v. Ciraolo, ante, p. 476 U. S. 207. The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant. For purposes of aerial surveillance, the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an "open field" in which an individual may not legitimately demand privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170. Here, EPA was not employing some unique sensory device not available to the public, but rather was employing a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking. The photographs were not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. Pp. 476 U. S. 234-239.

749 F.2d 307, affirmed.

BURGER, C.J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part III of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 476 U. S. 240. clubjuris

Page 476 U. S. 229


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