UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE

ATKINS V. RIVERA, 477 U. S. 154 (1986)

477 U. S. 154

U.S. Supreme Court

Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986)

Atkins v. Rivera

No. 85-632

Argued April 21, 1986

Decided June 23, 1986

477 U.S. 154

Syllabus

The Medicaid program of the Social Security Act (Act) provides medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary care and services. States participating in the program must provide coverage to the "categorically needy," that is, persons eligible for cash assistance under either the Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI) program or the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. A participating State also may elect to provide Medicaid benefits to the "medically needy," that is, persons who meet the nonfinancial eligibility requirements for cash assistance under AFDC or SSI, but whose income or resources exceed the financial eligibility standards for those programs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), the medically needy may qualify for Medicaid benefits if they incur medical expenses, i.e., "spend down," in an amount that reduces their income to the eligibility level. That section provides that a State is to take into account, "except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services], the costs . . . incurred for medical care," and must determine eligibility under standards that are "reasonable" and "comparable for all groups." Pursuant to § 1396a(a)(17), the Secretary issued a regulation permitting States to employ a maximum spenddown period of six months to compute income of the medically needy. Under § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III), a state Medicaid plan must prescribe

"the single standard to be employed in determining income and resource eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be employed in determining such eligibility which shall be the same methodology which would be employed under [AFDC or SSI]."

Under the Massachusetts Medicaid plan, persons who lack sufficient income measured on a monthly basis to meet their basic needs automatically qualify for Medicaid. Massachusetts also provides Medicaid benefits to persons who earn enough to meet their basic needs, but whose medical expenses within a 6-month period consume the amount by which their earnings exceed what is required for basic needs. The Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare denied respondents Medicaid benefits because their income exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit, and they incurred insufficient medical expenses within a 6-month period. clubjuris

Page 477 U. S. 155

After the denial was upheld on administrative review, respondents sought injunctive relief from the Massachusetts Superior Court against use of the 6-month spenddown period. That court held the period invalid, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that, in providing that the "same methodology" be used for both the categorically needy and the medically needy, the Act requires that a l-month period be applied in eligibility calculations for the medically needy.

Held: Massachussets' 6-month spenddown period for calculating the income of the medically needy does not violate the Act's "same methodology" requirement. Pp. 477 U. S. 161-167.

(a) The Secretary's regulation permitting States to employ a maximum spenddown period of six months plainly permits what Massachusetts has done. Because that regulation is supported by the Act's plain language and was adopted pursuant to the Act's explicit grant of rulemaking authority, it is entitled to "legislative effect," and is controlling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the Act. Pp. 477 U. S. 161-162.

(b) The history of the "same methodology" requirement demonstrates that it was never intended to control the length of the spenddown, but rather simply to instruct States to treat components of income similarly for both medically needy and categorically needy persons. Pp. 477 U. S. 162-166.

395 Mass. 189, 479 N.E.2d 639, reversed.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. clubjuris

Page 477 U. S. 156


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